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I. COURT ADDRESSES TWO
EMINENT DOMAIN ISSUES
City of North Charleston v. Claxton' raises two interesting questions
regarding the law of eminent domain. The first deals with the use of
comparable sales as evidence of the value of condemned land; the second is
whether the value of condemned land was influenced by being within the scope
of a public project. The South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed a jury
award of $79,500 in compensation for the taking of a lot.2 In so holding, the
court followed South Carolina precedent by allowing evidence of comparable
sales in valuing the condemned property and also by finding the Scope of the
Project Rule to be inapplicable.3
In 1985 Centre Point Associates announced plans for the Centre Point
development, to be built on approximately 394 acres at the intersection of
Interstate 26 and the Mark Clark Expressway in North Charleston. The
developer deeded 32 of the original 394 acres to the City of North Charleston.
The City planned to construct a development including the North Charleston
Coliseum on the site.4 The developer planned to use the remaining land for
the Centre Point Development.5
In February 1986 the Army Corps of Engineers issued a cease and desist
order stopping work on the private development's site until it determined the
amount of wetlands contained in the tract.6 Ultimately, the Corps found 194
acres of wetlands upon which nothing could be built. The Corps did not
classify the property conveyed to the City wetlands. The Corps finally agreed
that the development could continue if the City's project was not built on the
thirty-two acres donated by Centre Point.7
The developer negotiated an agreement with the City in which the City
agreed to convey back the original thirty-two acres in exchange for another
thirty-two acre tract within the development's site. However, the developer
owned only twenty-nine of the thirty-two acres that it agreed to convey to the
1. _ S.C._, 431 S.E.2d 610 (Ct. App. 1993), cert. denied, (1994).
2. Id. at _, 431 S.E.2d at 611.
3. Id. at _, 431 S.E.2d at 612.
4. Brief of Appellant at 9.
5. Claxton, _ S.C. at_, 431 S.E.2d at 611.
6. Id. at__, 431 S.E.2d at 612.
7. Id. at _,431 S.E.2d at 612.
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City.8 Therefore, the parties agreed that the developer would attempt to
purchase nine lots adjacent to the twenty-nine acre tract to complete the thirty-
two acre tract. These lots included the Claxton lot. If the developer could not
purchase the land, the City would condemn the land at the developer's
expense. 9 The developer purchased two of the nine lots; one from Robert
Kinard for $65,000 and another from Edward Judy for $80,000.10 The
developer then offered $45,000 for the Claxton lot, but the Claxtons
refused." Subsequently, the City condemned the Claxton lot in December
1989.12
The Claxtons requested a jury trial to determine the property's value. At
trial, the Claxtons' expert witness used the Kinard and Judy sales to value the
property at $90,000. The City's expert set the value on the date of taking at
$54,000. However, the City's expert said that the City's plans increased the
lot's value to $72,500.1 The jury valued the land at $79,500.14
Among other grounds, on appeal the City argued that the court should not
have admitted the Kinard and Judy sales to support the expert witness'
valuation of the Claxton lot.'" It argued that the sales were not comparable
because they were made under compulsion. 6 The City also argued that the
jury should not have considered the increase in the lot's value due to the City's
development because of the Scope of the Project Rule.' 7 The court of appeals
found sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that the sales were
voluntary.'" The court stated that the general rule in South Carolina allows
experts to base their opinions about property value on comparable sales in the
vicinity within a reasonable time of the condemnation hearing.' 9 Whether the
Kinard and Judy lots were sold under compulsion was a question of fact for
the jury's determination.' Therefore, the jury's finding stands unless "there
is no evidence which reasonably supports" the finding.2'
8. Id. at __, 431 S.E.2d at 612.
9. Brief of Appellant at 7.
10. Claxton, - S.C. at_, 431 S.E.2d at 612.
11. Brief of Respondent at 1.
12. Id. at 2.
13. Claxton, __ S.C. at _, 431 S.E.2d at 612.
14. Id. at_, 431 S.E.2d at 611.
15. Id. at _,431 S.E.2d at 612.
16. Id. at _,431 S.E.2d at 612.
17. Id. at _,431 S.E.2d at 612.
18. Claxton, _ S.C. at _, 431 S.E.2d at 612.
19. Id. at _,431 S.E.2d at 612 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 28-2-340(A) (5) (Law. Co-op
1991)).
20. Id. at _,431 S.E.2d at 612 (citing Duke Power Co. v. Opperman, 266 S.C. 99, 221
S.E.2d 782 (1976) (holding that the sufficiency of the foundation of an expert's opinion is a jury
question)).
21. Id. at _, 431 S.E.2d at 612 (citing Townes Assocs., Ltd. v. City of Greenville, 266
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The court held that the record disclosed sufficient evidence as to the
buyer's and sellers' voluntary participation in the sales?22 Regarding the
sales, the trial judge instructed the jury that "'[flair market value is the price
a willing buyer would pay and a willing seller would accept in the ordinary
course of business when neither person is being compelled to act.'"' Under
this instruction, the jury found that the lots were not purchased under
compulsion and that the sales were comparable.
The court also refused to adopt formally the Scope of the Project Rule as
the City had urged.24 The City contended that its plans increased the value
of the property. The City argued that the Scope of the Project Rule prevented
consideration of this increase in the value of condemned land originally
contemplated to be within the project.
In response, the court discussed South Carolina State Highway Depart-
ment v. Carodale Associates.' In that case, the state supreme court made
it clear that it was unsettled that the Scope of the Project rule applied in South
Carolina.26 The court also acknowledged a statute that prevents recovering
an increase in value of condemned land due to the placement of a public works
project on the land.27 The court found that the trial judge correctly instructed
the jury on this statute and that sufficient evidence existed to support the jury's
finding.28
The majority of jurisdictions allows comparable sales to form the basis of
an opinion as to the value of condemned property.2 9 South Carolina followed
the majority on this point in South Carolina State Highway Department v.
Estate of League.3" Although not mentioned in League, South Carolina also
S.C. 81, 221 S.E.2d 773 (1976)).
22. Id. at __, 431 S.E.2d at 612.
23. Claxton, - S.C. at _, 431 S.E.2d at 612 (quoting trial judge).
24. Id. at __, 431 S.E.2d at 613.
25. 268 S.C. 556, 235 S.E.2d 127 (1977).
26. Id. at 562, 235 S.E.2d at 129.
27. Claxton, __ S.C. at _, 431 S.E.2d at 613 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 28-2-350 (Law.
Co-op. 1991)).
28. Id. at _, 431 S.E.2d at 613.
29. 4 JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS' THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 12.311[3] (3d ed.
1985).
30. 251 S.C. 368, 162 S.E.2d 532 (1968). In that case the court said:
While no arbitrary limits can be laid down, it must appear that the location, usability,
and character of the other land was sufficiently similar to the land to be valued as to
reasonably indicate that the two tracts were comparable in value; and the sale of the
other land must have been sufficiently close in point of time and under such
conditions as to represent a true test of market value at the time of the acquisition of
the property to be valued.
Id. at 372, 162 S.E.2d at 533 (citations omitted).
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holds that comparable sales must be voluntary; sales made under compulsion
are not admissible as comparable sales for valuation purposes. 1
Generally, other jurisdictions have held that the compulsion must be of
some legal nature; economic compulsion alone does not suffice to disqualify
a sale from being considered comparable.32 These courts have found several
types of sales to be forced or compelled.33 For instance, a federal appellate
court listed sales such as foreclosures, sales under a deed of trust, and sales
at auction or attachment as examples of forced sales.34
Generally, courts have considered sales to parties having the power of
eminent domain inadmissible forced sales.3 For example, in Gomez Leon
v. State,36 the Texas Supreme Court held a sale to a university to be forced
because the university had the power of eminent domain. The court said
that the element of compulsion in such a sale resulted from the underlying
threat of condemnation.3" The idea is that the seller knows that the buyer can
take the land so the seller may as well sell.
Similarly, one commentator has written that a purchaser having the power
to take property may so impact the terms of the sale that no voluntary sale can
exist. 9 Additionally, such sales are inadmissible because they represent a
31. South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Hines, 234 S.C. 254, 258, 107 S.E.2d 643, 645
(1959) (stating that "the price realized from voluntary sales of similar land in the vicinity within
a reasonable time" is admissible) (emphasis added).
More broadly, the South Carolina Supreme Court has held that fair market value depends
partly upon a voluntary sale. In Housing Authority of Charleston v. Olasov, 282 S.C. 603, 320
S.E.2d 478 (Ct. App. 1984), the court defined fair market value as ". . . the price which a
willing buyer will pay a willing seller, neither being under compulsion to buy or sell and both
being fully informed of all uses to which the property is adopted and for which it is capable of
being used." Id. at 608, 320 S.E.2d at 481 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
32. See 5 JULIUS A. SACKMAN, NICHOLS' THE LAw OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 21.32 (3d ed.
rev. 1993). North Charleston quoted the same section in its brief to support the proposition that
economic compulsion suffices to disqualify a sale as comparable. Brief of Appellant at 18.
However, the treatise makes clear that this is not the majority rule.
The federal courts also follow the rule that economic compulsion alone is insufficient. See
United States v. Certain Land in City of Ft. Worth, 414 F.2d 1029 (5th Cir. 1969).
33. See District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency v. 61 Parcels of Land, 235 F.2d
864, 865 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (quoted in JACQUES B. GELIN & DAVID W. MILLER, TIlE FEDERAL
LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 4.2 (1982)).
34. Id.
35. See Fred M. Lange, Advantages and Pitfalls ofAppraisal Techniques, in NINTH INSTITUTE
ON EMINENT DOMAIN 83, 93 (1969) ("[A] sale to some entity having the power of eminent
domain does not meet the test of willing buyer and willing seller and is inadmissable in evidence
for any purpose."); I.R.C. § 1033(g) (1988) (recognizing sales made under threat of
condemnation as involuntary conversions).
36. 426 S.W.2d 562 (Tex. 1968).
37. Id. at 565.
38. Id. (citing State v. Curtis, 361 S.W.2d 448 (rex. Civ. App. 1962)).
39. 1 LEwIs ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 147 (2d ed.
[Vol. 46
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compromise that "furnishes no true indication of the price at which the
property could be sold in the open market to a 'willing buyer."'40 Interest-
ingly, these compromises can benefit the seller as well as the buyer.41
While South Carolina apparently adheres to this general rule,42 it also
long has recognized an exception to the rule not mentioned in Claxton: Courts
admit evidence of prior purchases by the condemnor to set the value of
condemned land if the condemnor was the only purchaser in a general
neighborhood in the recent past.43
In light of the foregoing discussion, the Kinard and Judy sales might have
been forced sales. Although the developer did not have the power to condemn
land, as did the university in the Leon case, it acted on behalf of the City -
an entity that clearly possessed the power of condemnation. The landowners
in the area knew of the development plans and the agreement between the City
and the developer. Conceivably, the landowners could have believed that the
City would condemn their land if they refused to sell to the develgapef. Under
the general rule, such an underlying threat of condemnation would likely result
in the sales being inadmissable because they arguably were made under
compulsion. In application, this rule leaves little guidance for the finder of
fact in valuing land sold under threat of condemnation.
Although the court did not address it in Claxton, South Carolina's
exception may allow the sales to be comparable. Under the agreement with
the City, the developer arguably acted as the condemnor. Also, the developer
was the major purchaser of land in the vicinity for several years. This
exception might have allowed admittance of the Kinard and Judy sales as
comparable sales to guide the finder of fact in valuing the land.
A related question concerns the application of the Scope of the Project
Rule to the Claxton condemnation. This issue concerns whether the Claxtons
can recover any increase in the land's value attributable to the project for
which the land was condemned.
Generally, the rule's applicability depends upon whether the land was
within the original condemnation scheme.' If the land is within the original
scope of the project, the recovery may not reflect any change in the land's
1953).
40. Id.
41. Id. ("Mhe condemnormay pay more in order to avoid the expense and uncertainty of the
condemnation proceeding, while the seller may accept less in order to avoid the same or similar
burdens.").
42. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
43. Charleston & W. Carolina Ry. v. Spartanburg Bonded Warehouse, Inc., 151 S.C. 542,
149 S.E. 236 (1929).
44. See Sackman, supra note 29, § 12B.17[8][b].
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value caused by the condemnation project.45  Otherwise, the owner's
recovery should reflect any change in the land's value.46
The United States Supreme Court has discussed this rule in two cases.
In United States v. Miller47 the Court stated that the test is whether the "lands
were probably within the scope of the project from the time the Government
was committed to it."4 1 In Miller the Court found that land condemned to
relocate a railroad was within the original scope of the condemnation
scheme.49 Since the land was within the original scope, the owner could not
recover any change in the property's value caused by the project.5"
The Court also discussed the rule in United States v. Reynolds.51 In
addition to holding that the rule's applicability was a question for the court,52
the opinion includes several instructive comments about the rule. First, the
Court tied the rule to the constitutional requirement of just compensation;
regarding land within the original scope, the Court stated "that to permit
compensation to be either reduced or increased because of an alteration in
market value attributable to the project itself would not lead to the 'just
compensation' that the Constitution requires."53 The Court also said that the
change in value of condemned land not within the original scope should be
considered because "fair market value is generally to be determined with due
consideration of all available economic uses of the property at the time of the
taking. "54
South Carolina courts have not yet had an opportunity to adopt the Scope
of the Project Rule. However, the South Carolina Supreme Court discussed
the rule very briefly in Carodale. In that case, the State Highway Department
condemned 0.47 acres of land of an exit ramp on Interstate 77. Although the
Board of Condemnation valued the land at $14,000, a jury awarded the
landowner $117,000 in compensation. The department appealed and argued
that the scope of the project rule prevented the landowner from realizing any
increase in the land's value because it was within the original scope of the
45. See id.
46. Id. § 12.B17[4] ("[A] parcel involved in the supplemental taking is entitled to the benefit
of any enhancement in value which resulted from the original taking.") (footnote omitted).
47. 317 U.S. 369 (1943).
48. Id. at 377.
49. Id.
50. See id.
51. 397 U.S. 14 (1970).
52. Id. at 20.
53. Id. at 16 (citing United States v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 635-36
(1901)).
54. Id. at 17 (citing United States V. Chandler-DunbarWater Power Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913)
and Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403 (1878)).
[Vol. 46
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project.5 After remanding the case on other grounds, the court discussed the
rule. It held that the rule did not apply to this situation because, unlike
Reynolds, there was no bifurcated condemnation during which the project
increased the land's value.
56
Reading Carodale as consistent with the instructions given in Reynolds,
the South Carolina Supreme Court seems to acknowledge a second type of
situation to which the Scope of the Project Rule does not apply. The situation
is one in which either there is no two-stage condemnation or the change in the
land's value is attributable to something other than the project. 7 In such a
situation, Carodale implies that the proper measure of compensation is the
value at the time of the taking and not the value at the time the government
commits to the project.58 This reading of Carodale is consistent with
Reynolds because Reynolds focused on changes in the value of condemned land
attributable to the project and not attributable to other influences.
59
For clarification of the effect of the Scope of the Project Rule, consider
the following condemnation situations. First, a development is completed and,
unexpectedly, adjacent land is condemned to expand the project. Because the
later acquired land was not within the original scope of the project, the rule
does not apply; the value of the later acquired land must reflect the change
caused by the development. Second, assume a situation in which either the
condemnation is completed in one stage or a change in value is caused by
something other than the project. Carodale implies that the rule does not
apply in such a situation and the court will value the land at the time of the
taking.' Finally, assume a well-defined development that is to be completed
in two stages. The rule applies in this situation, and the value of the land
condemned in the second stage may not reflect any change caused by the
project.
Several policy considerations support the Scope of the Project Rule. For
example, by preventing the influence of the project from changing the value
of land within the project's original scope, the rule assures just compensation
for owners of condemned land. The compensation is just because land within
the original scope could have be taken during the original condemnation phase
at its value at that time. By preventing the compensation from reflecting the
influence of the project, the rule encourages the condemnor to take only the
land necessary at the initial stage of the project.
55. Carodale, 268 S.C. at 562-63, 235 S.E.2d at 129.
56. Id. at 562, 235 S.E.2d at 129.
57. See SACKMAN, supra note 29, § 12B.17[8][d] (discussing the effect of changes in value
attributed to influences other than the project for which the land is being condemned).
58. See Carodale, 268 S.C. at 562, 235 S.E.2d at 129.
59. See Reynolds, 397 U.S. at 16.
60. See Carodale, 268 S.C. at 562, 235 S.E.2d at 129.
19941
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Moreover, the condemnor spends less tax money in the initial stages of
land acquisition. This may be important in projects with problematic funding
initially. Also, owners of land to be acquired later get to keep their property
until it actually is needed. Due to the drastic nature of a taking, this policy
consideration may be the most important.
Although South Carolina courts have not adopted the Scope of the Project
Rule, section 28-2-350 codifies a provision similar to the rule.6' This section
states that the "award of compensation may not be increased by reason of any
increases in the value of the property resulting from the placement of a public
works project on it.'62
Although Claxton is the only case to cite this provision, the statute's
language suggests that it functions as a codified Scope of the Project Rule. At
trial, the judge instructed the jury on the operation of this statute.63 Although
the City argued that the project influenced the amount awarded by the jury, the
court of appeals ultimately found sufficient evidence to support the award.64
After examining the relevant South Carolina law, the court of appeals' holding
seems justified.
John W. Davidson
II. COURT DEFINES POWER OF RELEASE
FOR FEE SIMPLE DETERMINABLE
South Carolina Department of Parks, Recreation, & Tourism v.
Brookgreen Gardens' addresses the transferability of future interests in land.
Consistent with earlier holdings, the South Carolina Court held that one can
convert a fee simple determinable into a fee simple absolute by releasing the
accompanying future interest (a possibility of reverter).2 Furthermore, the
court held that any individual entitled to the estate upon violation of the
61. S.C. CODE ANN. § 28-2-350 (Law. Co-op. 1991).
62. Id.
63. Claxton, __S.C. at __, 431 S.E.2d at 613. The judge charged the jury as follows:
The value given to the subject property before the taking on December 11, 1989, can
not [sic] contain any enhancement or increases in value attributable to the project if the
subject property is probably within the scope of the project from the time the city was
committed to it. Likewise, the value given the subject property can not [sic] be decreased
by anything attributable to the project.
Now, when I refer to the project, I refer to the coliseum, the civic center, placed and
designated on the map where it is going to be placed.
Id. at _, 431 S.E.2d at 613.
64. Id. at _, 431 S.E.2d at 613.
1. __ S.C. _, 424 S.E.2d 465 (1992).
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condition defining the fee simple determinable can execute the release. 3 Also,
the court reaffirmed the rule that the legal description in a deed governs
conflicting derivation information.4
In this case the parties did not dispute the relevant facts.5 Archer and
Anna Huntington formed Brookgreen Gardens, the respondent, as an
eleemosynary corporation in 1931. The Huntingtons created Brookgreen as
"a Society for Southeastern Flora and Fauna." 6 Between 1938 and 1941
Archer executed 4 land grants to Brookgreen, each including the following
restricting language:
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD all and singular the premises above men-
tioned unto the said BROOKGREEN GARDENS, A SOCIETY FOR
SOUTHEASTERN FLORA AND FAUNA and to its successors but not
to its assigns, upon the terms, covenants and conditions following, to wit:
That the premises herein granted are to be used solely for the corporate
purposes of said BROOKGREEN GARDENS... and maintained in a
wild state for the preservation, protection and propagation of wild flora
and fauna, and when the same shall cease to be used for such purposes or
so maintained, said premises shall immediately revert to the grantors or
their heirs. The grantors, or their heirs, upon breach of said condition
shall be entitled to enter upon and take possession of said premises in the
same manner as if this conveyance had not been made.7
In 1955 Archer Huntington died leaving his wife, Anna, as his sole heir.8
Five years later Brookgreen leased a portion of its land to the state for the
creation of Huntington Beach State Park. 9 Soon after the lease's execution,
Anna Huntington released "'all rights she had [should the condition be broken]
which might then exist or arise in favor of herself individually or as the sole
heir of her husband.'" 1
Following Hurricane Hugo, the Department of Parks, Recreation, and
Tourism (PRT) sought Brookgreen's approval for reconstruction and
3. See id. at _, 424 S.E.2d at 467 (citing Purvis; Burnett v. Snoddy, 199 S.C. 399, 19
S.E.2d 904 (1942); 28 AM. JR. 2D Estates § 185 (1966)).
4. See id. at _, 424 S.E.2d at 468.
5.Id. at , 424 S.E.2d at 465.
6. Brookgreen, _ S.C. at 424 S.E.2d at 466.
7. Brief of Petitioner at 2-3.
8. Brookgreen, _ S.C. at , 424 S.E.2d at 466.
9. Id. at __, 424 S.E.2d at 466.
10. Id. at _, 424 S.E.2d at 466. Even though Anna Huntington was a citizen of
Connecticut, the court applied South Carolina law because "'[tihe law of the situs would be
applied to determine whether a conveyance transfers an interest in land and the nature of the
interest transferred.'" Id. at _, 424 S.E.2d at 468 (alteration in original) (quoting RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS § 223(1) (1971)).
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improvement of its Huntington Beach State Park facilities." Fearing that if
Anna's release were ineffective, such expansion may violate the conditions of
the original Brookgreen grant and result in defeasance, both parties asked the
court to conclude "[w]hether the delivery of the Deed of Real Estate and
Release, signed by Anna Hyatt Huntington, converted Brookgreen's estate in
Huntington Beach into a fee simple absolute estate?"' 2
The court first determined the type of present estate the original grants
created. The grant's language clearly indicates either a fee simple determina-
ble or a fee simple subject to condition subsequent. "[F]unctional equiva-
lents,"" 3 both estates grant the fee provisionally, contingent upon the
nonoccurrence of a specified event. The significant distinction between the
two is their accompanying future interests:
[Ihe possibility of reverter [that follows the fee simple determinable]
automatically becomes a present estate in the grantor in fee simple, without
any election on the part of the grantor, on the occurrence of the event
specified in the instrument of conveyance. But a right of entry for
condition broken [following a fee simple subject to condition subsequent]
is a power to terminate the granted estate for breach of the condition and
until that power is properly exercised the grantee's estate continues despite
the breach.' 4
This distinction's importance is that apparently none of the parties objected to
the state's proposal to improve Huntington Beach State Park, even if such
expansion violated the original grant.' Thus, if the court classified the grant
as a fee simple subject to condition subsequent, Anna could opt not to exercise
the power to regain the fee upon breach. However, if the grant were a fee
simple determinable, the defeasance would occur by operation of law. 6
Generally, the grant's semantics govern the determination of whether the
grant is a fee simple determinable or a fee simple subject to condition
subsequent. For example, words such as "while," "during," "until," and "so
long as" indicate a fee simple determinable, and "upon condition that,"
"provided that," "but if," and "if it happen that" suggest the creation of a fee
11. Id. at 424 S.E.2d at 466.
12. Id. at 424 S.E.2d at 466.
13. CORNELIUS J. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 5 (2d ed.
1988) (footnote omitted).
14. Id.
15. Nothing indicates consultation with Archer Huntington's heirs at law.
16. Defeasance would not occur, however, if this right were waived properly and released
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simple subject to condition subsequent. 7  Based on the language of the
Brookgreen grant, the court held that Archer granted a fee simple determina-
ble, retaining a possibility of reverter in himself: "Archer M. Huntington's
original intent was for a possibility of reverter to arise, this interpretation
stems from the use of 'said premises shall immediately revert to the grantors
or their heirs,' in the habendum clauses." 8
Having concluded that Archer granted a fee simple determinable where
the fee upon breach immediately would return to the original grantor, the court
cursorily addressed the validity of Anna's release:
A possibility of reverter has been held in South Carolina as non-transfer-
able by will to a non heir, or by inter vivos alienation to a third party;
however, it may be released to the party holding the fee simple determina-
ble. Because Anna Hyatt Huntington was the sole heir of Archer M.
Huntington, any possibility of reverter rights would belong to her upon the
death of Archer M. Huntington. In June 1960, Anna Hyatt Huntington
executed and delivered a Deed of Real Estate, and Release, which acted
to release her possibility of reverter to Brookgreen Gardens [and to convert
Brookgreen's fee simple determinable into a fee simple absolute]. 19
Although its conclusion is consistent with prior holdings, the court fails to
address a crucial step in its analysis2" - how did Anna receive the possibility
of reverter retained by Archer if possibilities of reverter are not transferable
in South Carolina?
While one could read the court's holding as expanding the transferability
of possibilities of reverter, precedent permits a narrower reading. Because
contingent future interests "were thought of as possibilities of an estate or
mere expectancies rather than as estates," 2' they traditionally are inalien-
able.' The Brookgreen court cited Purvis v. McElveen as holding that
possibilities of reverter are "non-transferable [sic] by will to a non heir [sic],
or by inter vivos alienation to a third party."24 According to Purvis, a
possibility of reverter "is not an estate, but a mere possibility of acquiring
17. MOYNIHAN, supra note 13, at § 6.
18. South Carolina Dep't of Parks, Recreation, & Tourism v. Brookgreen Gardens, _ S.C.
__ _,424 S.E.2d 465, 467 (1992).
19. Id. at __, 424 S.E.2d at 467 (citing County of Abbeville v. Knox, 267 S.C. 38, 225
S.E.2d 863 (1976); Purvis v. McElveen, 234 S.C. 94, 106 S.E.2d 913 (1959); Burnett v.
Snoddy, 199 S.C. 399, 19 S.E.2d 904 (1942); 28 AM. JUR. 2D Estates § 185 (1966)).
20. The parties' briefs fail also to address this issue explicitly. See Brief of Petitioner at 8:
Brief of Respondent at 9.
21. MOYNIHAN, supra note 13, at § 7.
22. See id.
23. 234 S.C. 94, 106 S.E.2d 913 (1959).
24. Brookgreen, _ S.C. at _, 424 S.E.2d at 467.
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one. It cannot be the subject of devise or inheritance. Nor can it be
conveyed. "'
This inalienability leaves the question of what happens to the fee when the
condition defining a fee simple determinable is breached after the grantor's
death. Purvis addresses this issue directly:
Because the grant of a fee simple determinable ... has left nothing in the
grantor that can be the subject of devise or inheritance, the whole estate
will, upon the happening of the event of defeasance, pass, if the grantor
be then dead, not to those who were his heirs at the time of his death, but
to those who answer to the description of his heirs at the time of the
termination of the estate granted.26
This rule of delayed qualification in the class of heirs suggests that the
possibility of reverter does not actually belong to anyone until the breach
occurs. Prior to the breach, a threat of defeasance limiting the fee's holder
exists. Logically, Anna may not have owned enough of a property right to
release.
Given this rule, had the condition contained in the Huntington-Brookgreen
conveyance been broken after Archer's death, the fee simple would return to
Anna, his only heir at breach. Equally, had the condition been broken after
Anna's death, she would not have been an heir. Thus, Brookgreen could have
deliberately breached the condition in 1960, causing a defeasance in favor of
Archer's only heir Anna. Then, Anna would have had a fee simple absolute
and could have deeded the property to Brookgreen in any way that she wished.
While a reconveyance would accomplish the parties' objectives, a release
is preferable because of the inconvenience and uncertainty inherent in staging
a breach sufficient to trigger defeasance. A release automatically transforms
the estate into a fee simple absolute.27 Who then can release a possibility of
25. Purvis, 234 S.C. at 99, 106 S.E.2d at 916 (citing Vaughn v. Langford, 81 S.C. 282, 62
S.E. 316 (1908); Blount v. Walker, 31 S.C. 13, 9 S.E. 804 (1889); Pearse V. Killian, 16 S.C.
Eq. (McMul. Eq.) 231 (1841) (per curiam); 2 HERBERT T. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL
PROPERTY § 314 (3d ed. 1939); P.M.D., Annotation, Inheritable - Quality of Possibility of
Reverter, 77 A.L.R. 344 (1932)).
26. Id. at 100, 106 S.E.2d at 916 (citing Waller v. Waller, 220 S.C. 212, 66 S.E.2d 876
(1951); Blount, 31 S.C. at 13, 9 S.E. at 804).
27. Release, supra note 16 at 1111. This annotation and several cases discussed later address
possibilities of reverter resulting from a grant of a fee simple conditional, rather than a fee simple
determinable. A possibility of reverter follows both estates. "To A and the heirs of his body"
creates a fee simple conditional. Because the condition governing a fee simple conditional is
always that the grantee have children, defeasance could only occur upon the grantoree's death,
the first instant in which no children can be born. Other than these differences, a fee simple
conditional and a fee simple determinable operate alike, and therefore, case law on one applies
equally to the other. Cf. Purvis, 234 S.C. at 100-01, 106 S.E.2d at 916.
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reverter? If the possibility of reverter does not belong to anyone until
defeasance (or perhaps belongs to a class, whose members are unknowable
until defeasance), how are those individuals with the right to release identified?
Although these questions are critical to determinating the release's
validity, the Brookgreen court failed to address them specifically. Instead the
court cited Purvis for the proposition that "[b]ecause Anna Hyatt Huntington
was the sole heir of Archer M. Huntington, any possibility of reverter rights
would belong to her upon the death of Archer M. Huntington."'28 Addressing
release, Purvis cites earlier cases for the rule "that he who would be entitled
to the estate if the fee conditional should presently determine might, in
praesenti, but not by will, release it to the tenant of the conditional fee so as
to make his estate an absolute fee simple."29 Alone, this statement may mean
that only the original grantor can release a possibility of reverter. However,
an examination of the cases proves that the statement indeed does apply to
anyone entitled to the estate upon breach of the condition.
In Pearse John granted Sarah a fee simple conditional, and consequently
"there was in the donor. . . a right or possibility of reverter, which he
transmitted to his heirs. "3 Furthermore,
Samuel Pearse now answers the description of heir of his father [John, the
original grantor] and would have the right to the estate, if the fee simple
conditional were now to determine. And having that right, though he
could neither convey nor devise it, I think he may release it to the tenant
of fee conditional [Sarah], so as to make her estate an absolute fee
simple.3
In dictum Vaughan suggests that "a release could not be made effective by
will, for the reason that a will could have no legal effect until the death of the
testator; and at the moment of death the possibility of reverter passes from the
testator and beyond his control to his heir. "3 Applying these rules,
apparently Anna could release the possibility of reverter as Archer's sole heir
and recipient of the fee had the condition been broken.
In conclusion, South Carolina law continues to permit heirs to release a
possibility of reverter and free the estate from its limiting condition. The
Brookgreen court reaffirmed the nontransferability rule; an heir still cannot
receive inter vivos a possibility of reverter and likewise cannot transfer it inter
28. Brookgreen, _ S.C. at _, 424 S.E.2d at 467.
29. Purvis, 234 S.C. at 99, 106 S.E.2d at 916 (citing Vaughan, 81 S.C. 282, 62 S.E. 316;
Pearse, 16 S.C. Eq. (McMul, Eq.) 231).
30. Pearse, 16.S.C. Eq. (McMul. Eq.) at 232.
31. Id.
32. Vaughan, 81 S.C. at 285, 62 S.E. at 317.
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vivos. The right to release remains only a narrow exception to that general
rule.
Leigh Ammons Meese
I. ATrEMPTs To LIMrr SOME DEDICATIONS FAIL
In Timberlake Plantation Co. v. County of Lexington' the South Carolina
Supreme Court held that a developer who dedicated roads within a develop-
ment to public maintenance and right-of-way could not retain the right to deny
a cable television company access to the development's rights-of-way. 2 In its
decision, the court considered the nature of the dedicated land and the
dedicator's attempt to control future use of the dedicated areas.
Timberlake Plantation Company (Timberlake) developed a residential
community on Lake Murray in Lexington County.3 On May 4, 1987,
Timberlake contracted with Star Cable Associates (Star), giving Star an
exclusive right to provide cable television service throughout the Timberlake
residential development. Timberlake would not allow any other company or
person to supply cable or satellite service in the development for the term of
the agreement.4 In August 1988 Timberlake filed a final plat with the
Lexington County Register of Mesne Conveyance that dedicated certain roads
in the Timberlake Plantation for public maintenance. The plat for the roads
contained the following language:
... Timberlake Plantation Company ... dedicates all roads and
associated storm drainage for public maintenance.... Furthermore,
Timberlake Plantation Company, as owner of the property shown and
described hereon, reserves unto itself certain rights as to any encroachment
into the established easements and rights-of-way above. Any such
encroachment of easements and rights-of-way will require prior written
recorded approval of Timberlake Plantation Company or its assignee,
Timberlake Plantation Property Owners' Association, Inc. 5
In November 1988 Columbia Cable T.V. (CCTV) obtained encroachment
permits from Lexington County to lay cable along public easements in
Timberlake Plantation. Timberlake did not consent to CCTV's planned
construction and sought to enjoin CCTV from laying cable.6
1. - S.C. _, 431 S.E.2d 573 (1993).
2. Id. at _, 431 S.E.2d at 576.
3. Id. at , 431 S.E.2d at 574.
4. Id. at __, 431 S.E.2d at 574.
5. Id. at _, 431 S.E.2d at 574.
6. Tinberlake, _ S.C. at _, 431 S.E.2d at 574.
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The trial court ruled for Timberlake and enjoined CCTV from entering
Timberlake Plantation to provide cable service. They found that the "limited
dedication of roads and drainage systems 'for maintenance only' did not create
public easements that Lexington County had authority to authorize a third
party to use, enter upon, or occupy."' The court of appeals reversed, holding
that the Star-Timberlake exclusive agreement violated the Federal Communica-
tions Policy Act's goal of encouraging competition.' On May 17, 1993, the
South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' holding, noting
that. . . "Timberlake's attempt to retain discretionary control of property
dedicated to the public was ineffective" and that the Timberlake dedications
"created public easements for use consistent with their character. "9
The Timberlake court concluded that all the dedicated roads within
Timberlake Plantation were public easements."° Consequently, the issue of
private easements became irrelevant, and the court did not further address it.
More importantly, the court negated Star's argument that Timberlake made a
limited dedication that gave Timberlake discretionary power over the use of
the roads. The court held that the dedication was not limited because
dedications "must be made to the use of the public exclusively, and not merely
to the use of the public in connection with a user by the owners in such
measure as they may desire."" The court reasoned that while a landowner
could dedicate land for a specific purpose, the landowner could not retain
control over its future after the public accepted the property." The court
held that Timberlake's reliance on Knoerr v. Crews3 was misplaced.14
Timberlake cited Knoerr for its recognition of limited dedications in South
Carolina. The Knoerr court stated:
[W]hen property is dedicated to the public the intent of the dedicator as to
the use to which it may be put controls. Where such intent is clearly
expressed and is specific and restricted, no deviation from such use may
be permitted no matter how advantageous the chaiiged use may be to the
public .... 1
5
7. Id. at __, 431 S.E.2d at 574-75.
8. Id. at _, 431 S.E.2d at 575.
9. Id. at __, 431 S.E.2d at 575.
10. Id. at _, 431 S.E.2d at 575.
11. Timberlake, - S.C. at _, 431 S.E.2d at 575 (citing Safety Bldg. & Loan Co. v.
Lyles, 131 S.C. 542, 545, 128 S.E. 724, 724 (1925)).
12. Id. at _, 431 S.E.2d at 575.
13. 246 S.C. 174, 143 S.E.2d 120 (1965).
14. Timberlake, - S.C. at _, 431 S.E.2d at 575.
15. Knoerr, 246 S.C. at 177, 143 S.E.2d at 121 (citing Sloan v. City of Greenville, 235 S.C.
277, 111 S.E.2d 573 (1959), Miller v. City of Columbia, 138 S.C. 343, 136 S.E. 484 (1926);
Grady v. City of Greenville, 129 S.C. 89, 123 S.E. 494 (1923); and McCormac V. Evans, 107
S.C. 39, 92 S.E. 19 (1916)).
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Therefore, Timberlake argued that South Carolina law treats the dedicator as
the master of the dedication and, accordingly, the dedicator can limit the scope
of the dedication. 16  The Timberlake court disagreed, stating that "[t]he
essence of a dedication is that it shall be for the use of the public at large." 17
The court went further by equating a dedication to a grant: "In its effect upon
the landowner's rights, there is no essential difference between a dedication
and a grant."18
According to Timberlake, this dedication "created public easements for
use consistent with their character." 9 The character of public roads includes
the notion that encroachments may be made upon their rights-of-way.20
Consequently, the South Carolina Supreme Court strictly followed section
58-12-10,21 which states that after obtaining approval from the appropriate
governing body, any cable company may "construct, maintain, and operate its
cable . . .over, beneath, or along any . . . public roads of the State. "I
Thus, the court held "that any cable television company may construct,
maintain, and operate its cable along publicly dedicated roads in Timberlake
Plantation in accordance with the provisions of the South Carolina Cable
Act. "I The court's holding allowed CCTV access to Timberlake Plantation
to provide cable television service despite the exclusive agreement between
Timberlake and Star.
Public dedications require not only a clear and unequivocal abandonment
of interest but also the public's acceptance of such an interest.2" In the past,
South Carolina courts have recognized limited dedications.25 Cases support-
ing limited dedication assert that the dedicator controls the dedication and thus
has some level of control over the intended use of the dedicated lands.26
Timberlake Plantation dedicated certain roads and attempted to reserve the
right to approve any encroachments on the rights-of-way of these dedicated
16. Reply Brief of Petitioner at 2.
17. Timberlake, - S.C. at _, 431 S.E.2d at 575 (citingLyles, 131 S.C. at 542, 128 S.E.
at 724).
18. Id. at _, 431 S.E.2d at 575 (citing Grady v. City of Greenville, 129 S.C. 89, 95, 123
S.E. 494, 497 (1924)).
19. Id. at _, 431 S.E.2d at 575.
20. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 58-12-10 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992).
21. Id.
22. Timberlake, _ S.C. at _, 431 S.E.2d at 576 (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 58-12-10
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992)).
23. Id. at _, 431 S.E.2d at 576 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 58-12-10 to -130 (Law. Co-op.
1992)).
24. Anderson v. Town of Hemingway, 269 S.C. 351, 353, 237 S.E.2d 489, 490 (1977).
25. See, e.g., Derby Heights, Inc. v. Gantt Water & Sewer Dist., 237 S.C. 144, 116 S.E.2d
13 (1960); Sloan v. City of Greenville, 235 S.C. 277, 111 S.E.2d 573 (1959).
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roads.27 Timberlake's attempt to limit the dedication is the most important
factor in Timberlake. Although a dedicator may impose reasonable restrictions
upon dedication, 28 there are limits to such restrictions. Various commenta-
tors have recognized that "[t]he dedicator cannot attach to the dedication any
conditions or limitations inconsistent with or repugnant to the grant, or which
take the property from the control of public authorities, or which are against
public policy. Such conditions are void, and leave the grant in full and
unrestricted operation. "2 The Timberlake decision focuses on these types of
repugnant restrictions and limitations. The result raises serious questions
about the availability of a limited dedication in South Carolina.
The court invalidated Timberlake's dedication for two reasons. First,
Timberlake's attempt to limit the scope of the dedication appears to have been
repugnant to South Carolina's public policy of allowing general access to
public roads." Timberlake's attempted reservation of discretion was
inconsistent with the use and nature of public roads. Allowing this kind of
residual discretion would endanger the inherent nature of public roads and
would undermine the authority of public officials who control the use of public
roads.3" Because stringing cable is within the parameters of a public road's
right-of-way, CCTV could enter Timberlake Plantation and establish its cable
system.
32
Second, the attempted limitation apparently lacked the specificity required
to limit effectively a dedication.33 Had Timberlake used more specific and
careful language with detailed restrictions on the use of the dedicated lands,
this dispute might have been prevented. However, considering the nature of
the dedicated land, this is doubtful.
In summary, Timberlake signifies the South Carolina Supreme Court's
refusal to recognize any general attempts to limit dedications without specific
language and to allow limited dedications in areas generally used for the public
benefit. Otherwise, landowners could dedicate lands for public use and
simultaneously use their discretion to dictate use of the land. This defeats the
entire purpose of dedication.
The court did not accept Star's and Timberlake's reliance on Knoerr.34
In Knoerr a landowner dedicated a certain plot of land to the City of Seneca
for the erection of a rail depot and "'to leave as open squares for the
convenience of the public and of the said Railway Company the lots laid out
27. Timberlake, _ S.C. _, 431 S.E.2d at 574.
28. 23 AM. JUR. 2D Dedications § 9 (1983).
29. Id. (footnotes omitted).
30. See Timberlake, _ S.C. at__, 431 S.E.2d at 575.
31. See id. at__ n.1,431 S.E.2d at 575 n.1.
32. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 58-12-10 (Supp. 1992).
33. See Timberlake, _ S.C. at __, 431 S.E.2d at 575.
34. Id. at _, 431 S.E.2d at 575.
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in Seneca City."' 35 When the city wanted to construct a parking area on the
open area, several taxpayers sought an injunction to prevent the parking
construction.3 6 The Knoerr court held that the use of property dedicated to
the public is controlled by the dedicator's intent when the dedicator's intent is
clearly expressed and is specific and restricted. 37  In such cases, "no
deviation from such use may be permitted no matter how advantageous the
changed use may be to the public." 38 Timberlake and Star relied on this
language, arguing that Timberlake's dedication was not made to the public
generally but only for maintenance.39 The trial court agreed with this
argument, holding that the roads in Timberlake did not become public roads
when dedicated to Lexington County for maintenance purposes.4"
The Knoerr court also held that where the dedicator's intent is unclear the
public can use the dedicated property for any public purpose determined by the
proper legal authority.4 The city's use of the Knoerr property as a parking
lot was consistent with the general terms of the dedication, and the court
allowed the city to determine the proper use of the dedicated lands.4 2 Thus,
Timberlake and Star were overdependent on Knoerr because Knoerr expressly
provides for general use of dedicated lands when the limits on the dedication
lack clarity.
One of the most significant points the court made in Timberlake is that a
dedicator cannot limit a dedication by attempting to retain discretion over
future use.43 The Timberlake court went further by equating a dedication and
a grant." This holding indicates that a dedication is a permanent and
significant transfer of a property interest. Thus, if the dedicator wants to
ensure that the public will use the land in a certain way, the dedicator must
specifically state the parameters of the dedication.
Most interestingly, the South Carolina Supreme Court did not recognize
restrictions that retain discretion over future public use. In Timberlake Star
argued that the dedication was made for the limited purpose of receiving
public maintenance so that the public acquired a mere right of passage in
exchange for the obligation to maintain the roads.45 The court disagreed,
holding that the dedication of a street must be made for the purposes known
35. Knoerr, 246 S.C. at 176, 143 S.E.2d at 120 (quoting language of grant).
36. See id. at 176, 143 S.E.2d at 121.
37. Id. at 177, 143 S.E.2d at 121.
38. Id., 143 S.E.2d at 121.
39. See Timberlake, - S.C. at _, 431 S.E.2d at 575.
40. Id. at __, 431 S.E.2d at 574.
41. Knoerr, 246 S.C. at 177, 143 S.E.2d at 121 (citing 26 C.J.S. Dedication § 65).
42. Id. at 177, 143 S.E.2d at 121.
43. See Timberlake, - S.C. at _, 431 S.E.2d at 575.
44. Id. at _, 431 S.E.2d at 575 (citing Grady, 129 S.C. at 95, 123 S.E. at 497).
45. See id. at _, 431 S.E.2d at 575.
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not only at the time of the grant "but for all purposes, present and prospective,
consistent with its character as a public highway, and not actually detrimental
to the abutting real estate."46
Timberlake clarifies and enhances the Knoerr decision by implying that
if the dedicated property is not restricted specifically, any use of the dedicated
area consistent with the property's nature that benefits the public may be a
proper use of the dedicated area. Furthermore, this decision establishes that
dedicators cannot limit certain types of property, such as roads, and cannot
reserve future discretion in the dedication. Therefore, Star and Timberlake's
attempt to restrict the use of the roads to right of passage and maintenance was
ineffective. After Timberlake it is unclear what a dedicator must do to
limit a dedication in South Carolina. Other jurisdictions have recognized that
"an owner making a voluntary dedication may annex conditions and limitations
to the grant at his pleasure, so long as they are consistent with, and will not
defeat, the purpose of the dedication. . .. "1 In Timberlake the attempted
limitations clearly defeated the purpose of dedicating the roads to the public
because the public was dependent upon Timberlake's discretion regarding the
roads. While South Carolina law supports the theory of limited dedications,"
Timberlake narrows the use of such limitations.
On the surface it appears that use of very specific language clearly
indicating the dedicator's wishes is required to limit a dedication. However,
the Timberlake grant contained specific language:
I hereby certify that I am a Vice President of Timberlake Plantation
Company ... and that Timberlake Plantation Company adopts this plan
of subdivision with its free consent, establishes easements and rights-of-
way as noted, and dedicates all roads and associated storm drainage for
public maintenance. . . . Furthermore, Timberlake Plantation Company,
as owner of the property shown and described hereon, reserves unto itself
certain rights as to any encroachment into the established easements and
rights-of-way above. Any such encroachment of easements and rights-of-
way will require prior written recorded approval of Timberlake Plantation
Company or its assignee, Timberlake Plantation Property Owners'
Association, Inc.49
46. Id. at _, 431 S.E.2d at 575.
47. 4 HERBERT T. TIFANY, The Law of Real Property § 1111 (3d ed. 1975) (citing cases
from nine jurisdictions including Baldwin Manor, Inc. v. City of Birmingham, 67 N.W.2d 812
(Mich. 1954) (holding that an alternative beneficial use, contrary to dedicated park's original
purpose, did not justify deviating from original purpose) and Magnolia Petroleum Co. v.
Drauver, 83 P.2d 840 (Okla. 1938) (holding that when dedication restrictions are clear and not
repugnant, they are binding on all subsequent purchaser).
48. See cases cited supra note 25.
49. Timberlake, _ S.C. at __, 431 S.E.2d at 574 (emphasis added).
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Despite this specific attempt at limitation, the court refused to recognize the
limitation. This refusal evidences a preference for unrestricted dedications.
The nature of the dedicated lands probably was the key factor in this case. Had
some other kind of property been dedicated, the specificity of the language
likely would have been more effective.
As a result, the importance of Timberlake is that a dedicator may not limit
the dedication of areas generally used by the public because the inherent nature
of these areas is to be fully dedicated to the public without residual discretion.
Other jurisdictions have recognized that roads may be dedicated for use
only in certain seasons,"0 or subject to certain specific uses, or even for use
at certain times.51
However, courts generally hold that:
t]he dedication of property for the purpose of a highway carries the right
to public travel and also to the use for all present and future agencies
commonly adopted by public authority for the benefit of the people, such
as sewer, water, gas, lighting, and telephone systems, and a condition in
a deed of dedication prohibiting such uses or circumscribing the future
freedom of action of the authorities to devote the street to the wants and
convenience of the public is void as against public policy or as inconsistent
with the grant. 52
Courts hold also that the dedicator's reservations that create exclusive rights
to construct, maintain, and control utility lines on or beside any public road
are prohibited when statutes reflect a policy of allowing public access to such
areas.53 Thus, Timberlake is consistent with decisions in other jurisdictions
in disallowing this kind of restriction.
Many issues arose in Timberlake, including the validity of an exclusive
cable agreement, application of the Federal Cable Act, and questions of
unconstitutional takings. However, the central issue of this case is the
supreme court's interpretation of limited dedications. In Timberlake the court
held that an attempt to dedicate a road within a subdivision only for public
maintenance and right of passage was ineffective and actually created a general
50. Hughes v. Bingham, 32 N.E. 78 (N.Y. 1892).
51. See TIFFANY, supra note 47, § 1111 (citing, among others, City of Noblesville v. Lake
Erie & W. Ry. Co., 29 N.E. 484 (Ind. 1891); Hooker v. City of Grosse Pointe, 44 N.W.2d 134
(Mich. 1950); and Atlantic City v. Associated Realties Corp., 70 A. 345 (N.J. 1908)).
52. TIFFANY, supra note 47, § 1111 (citing, among others, Callahan v. Ganneston Park Dev.
Corp., 245 A.2d 274 (Me. 1968); Levi v. Schwartz, 95 A.2d 322 (Md. Ct. App. 1953); Richey
v. Shephard, 53 N.W.2d 487 (Mich. 1952); City of Camdenton v. Sho-Me Power Corp., 237
S.W.2d 94 (Mo. 1951); Riley v. Davidson, 196 S.W.2d 557 (rex. Civ. App. 1946)).
53. 23 AM. JUR. 2D Dedication § 10 (1983) (citing Gulf Properties of Ala., Inc. v. Southern
Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 346 So.2d 1085 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
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dedication. In effect this gave the public use of the roads and allowed other
uses generally associated with use of public roads.
The court refused to address the issue of government takings and private
easements because of its interpretation that the dedication created a public
easement, which made all other issues irrelevant. The Timberlake court
strengthened the power of a dedication by making it more difficult to make a
limited dedication unless the dedicator uses specific language. Furthermore,
with certain kinds of property, a limited restriction may not be effective
because of the inherent nature of the property for public use. As a result, the
availability of a limited dedication is unclear, and its validity likely will
depend on the particular facts of the case, the language of the attempted
limitation, and the nature of the dedicated property.
Matthew B. Roberts
IV. VALUE OF BUSINESS MAY NOT BE ADDED
To TAKINGS DAMAGE CALCULATION
South Carolina Department of Highways & Public Transportation v.
Galbreath' addresses the valuation of condemned properties on which
businesses are situated. In Galbreath the South Carolina Court of Appeals
held that in calculating the damages for a taking, a court may not add the
value of a business to the realty's value. However, the court may consider the
business value in determining the real property's value. Galbreath reaffirms
the rule announced thirty years ago by the South Carolina Supreme Court in
South Carolina State Highway Department v. Bolt.2
The South Carolina Department of Highways and Public Transportation
condemned a portion of Galbreath's property on which he operated a Western
Auto Store. Before the condemnation, Galbreath used the property to display
riding lawn mowers and garden tractors. The court had to value only that
condemned portion of Galbreath's property.
Before trial, the circuit court granted the Department's motion in limine
3
to exclude the testimony of Galbreath's economist who was to testify about the
profits that Galbreath would lose from the loss of the display area. The court
reasoned that Galbreath could present general evidence of previous sales and
lost profits but that the evidence of exact profits was irrelevant. Galbreath
1. __ S.C. _, 431 S.E.2d 625 (Ct. App. 1993). This case also addresses juror
disqualification, an issue this article will not discuss.
2. 242 S.C. 411, 131 S.E.2d 264 (1963).
3. In its opinion, the court of appeals indicated that Galbreath might have made a procedural
error by relying on the in limine ruling without subsequently presenting the economist's testimony
during trial. Galbreath may have erred because the supreme court has held that a ruling on a
motion in limine is not final as to the admissibility of evidence. Galbreath, _ S.C. at ,
431 S.E.2d at 627 n.2 (citing State v. Floyd, 295 S.C. 518, 369 S.E.2d 842 (1988)).
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presented a real estate appraiser who testified about the loss in market value
of the remaining property, taking into consideration loss of access and the loss
of the display area. Galbreath himself testified to the loss of sales and profits
that his business sustained. After the jury awarded Galbreath $13,001, he
twice motioned for new trials.4 The court denied both motions. Galbreath
appealed to the South Carolina Court of Appeals, which affirmed the lower
court's holding.
In Galbreath, the court of appeals upheld the trial court's exclusion of the
economist's testimony because: (1) the testimony was precluded by the rule
from Bolt and (2) even if the testimony were permissible under Bolt, the court
could exclude the evidence as cumulative.5
Under the first rationale, the court applied Bolt, a case in which the South
Carolina Supreme Court held that a court cannot add the value of a business
carried out upon a property to the realty's value when the court assesses
takings damages. Bolt stated further that a court should consider, however,
the business' value in assessing the realty's market value.'
Secondly, the court reasoned that even if the economist's testimony had
been admissible under Bolt, the trial court did not err in excluding it because
the testimony would have been cumulative.7 The real estate appraiser and
Galbreath himself testified that the business was a "good" business; thus, there
was no additional need for the economist's testimony.
Although Galbreath clearly states Bolt's holding, the opinion does not
explicitly apply the rule to the facts in Galbreath.' Both parties agreed that
Bolt does not permit a court to consider lost business profits as an independent
element in determining just compensation.' The plaintiff argued chiefly that
the dispute centered around whether Bolt permitted the economist's testimony
to help estimate the market value of the condemned property by providing
evidence of "the most advantageous and profitable use" 10 of the property.
The opinion did not directly address this argument. The court articulated the
plaintiff's argument: "Galbreath recognized lost profits are not recoverable
as an independent element of damage, but he wanted to present the evidence
4. Galbreath based his second motion for a new trial upon the alleged disqualification of one
of the jurors. Galbreath, - S.C. at _, 431 S.E.2d at 626.
5. Id. at __, 431 S.E.2d at 628.
6. Bolt, 242 S.C. at 418, 131 S.E.2d at 267.
7. Galbreath, _ S.C. at _, 431 S.E.2d at 628.
8. Only from the court's later statement "[E]ven if [the economist's] testimony would have
been admissible under Bolt. . .," does the reader know that the court applies Bolt to exclude the
economist's testimony. Id. at _, 431 S.E.2d at 628.
9. See Brief of Respondent at 3; Brief of Appellant at 7.
10. Bolt, 242 S.C. at 419, 131 S.E.2d at 267. Bolt stated more specifically, "[lit is proper
to take into consideration the existence of a going business on the land in question as indicative
of the highest economic use to which the land may be put." Id. at 418, 131 S.E.2d at 267.
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to establish that his business was a 'good' business, that is, profitable, so that
the jury could assess damages based upon the property's highest and best
use." 1 Despite recognizing the plaintiff's argument, the court failed to
address the distinction. Hence, the court did not provide guidance as to why
the economist's testimony was irrelevant in establishing that Galbreath's
business was a good business; this seems to be the most relevant evidence in
determining whether a business is a good business. The issue blurs more
when later in the opinion the court hints at the possible admissibility if the
economist's testimony: "We hold, therefore, that even if [the economist's]
testimony would have been admissible under Bolt with a limiting instruction
that it could only be considered for evaluating whether he had a 'good'
business prior to the taking, the testimony would have been cumulative." 12
The plaintiff sought this very limiting instruction, that the testimony only be
considered for evaluating whether Galbreath had a 'good' business. Thus, the
court initially rejected the plaintiff's argument but later declared the argument
acceptable. To reconcile these views, although ostensibly seeking to include
evidence of a good business, in fact, Galbreath must have sought to present
the economist's testimony to recover lost business as an independent element
of damage.
The court of appeals' second reason for affirming the trial court 3
provides a sounder basis for its holding. Galbreath and a real estate appraiser
testified to the property's diminution in value and to the business' loss of sales.
Thus, although perhaps more detailed, the economist's testimony would have
been cumulative and excludable.
Although the court of appeals cannot overturn a supreme court rule,
Galbreath presented the court of appeals with an opportunity to discuss
whether the theoretical foundations 4 of the Bolt rule remain valid. Why
should a court refuse to consider the loss of business of the landowner as an
independent element of damage in a taking? Are the rationales originally
offered to support the rule still viable? Some states have reanalyzed the
business loss rule in light of these questions, resulting in the rule's significant
modification in other states.'
5
11. Galbreath, _ S.C. at _, 431 S.E.2d at 626.
12. Id. at ,431 S.E.2d at 628.
13. Id. at __, 431 S.E.2d at 628. The court indicates that even "if the trial court erred in
excluding evidence, there is no reversible error where the testimony would have been
cumulative." Id. at __, 431 S.E.2d at 628 (citing Goddard v. Fairways Dev. Gen. Partnership,
S.C. __, 426 S.E.2d 828 (Ct. App. 1993)).
14. Neither Galbreath nor Bolt provide reasons for the business losses rule. Initially Bolt
adopted the rule based on statements in American Jurisprudence and Corpus Juris Secundum as
well as a Connecticut case, Housing Authority v. Lustig, 90 A.2d 169, 171 (Conn. 1952). Bolt,
242 S.C. at 418, 131 S.E.2d at 267.
15. See infra notes 33-43 and accompanying text.
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In South Carolina, the Eminent Domain Procedure Act'" sets forth the
measure of compensation: "In determining just compensation, only the value
of the property to be taken, any diminution in the value of the landowner's
remaining property, and any benefits... may be considered." 7
South Carolina follows the widely accepted rule'" that business losses are not
compensable: "[I]t is the general rule that injury to or loss of business
resulting from the taking is not considered as an element of damage in eminent
domain proceedings ....
Several arguments support the business losses rule. Among the traditional
reasons given for excluding evidence of business income are that such losses
are too speculative and too uncertain.2" Some authorities have argued so
because such losses depend upon diverse circumstances, making the losses
difficult to determine.2'
Cases outside of eminent domain reveal that the difficulty in ascertaining
profits as an excuse for denying business losses is not a valid objection. For
example, contract cases do not support that rationale.' Furthermore, tort
cases allow for loss of future earning capacity.' If determining compensa-
tion for pain and suffering is not too speculative, then certainly a court cannot
consider lost profits so. The courts resolve the question of uncertainty of
damages through the presentation of evidence. There is no reason why the
courts cannot use the same procedure in eminent domain cases. Thus, the
uncertainty argument rightfully is criticized as inconsistent since "courts allow
proof of loss of profits damages in most types of actions, on a case by case
basis, and yet in eminent domain cases bar all such claims as inherently
speculative. "24 Another argument supporting the notion that business losses
are too speculative is that profits depend more upon the efforts of the business
owner than the land itself.? Even if assumed to be valid, however, this
argument does not address whether losses are ascertainable. Instead the
16. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 28-2-10 to -510 (Law. Co-op. 1991)
17. Id. § 28-2-370.
18. See Lynda J. Oswald, Goodwill and Going-Concern Value: Emerging Factors in the Just
Compensation Equation, 32 B.C. L. REV. 283, 319 (1991).
19. Bolt, 242 S.C. at 418, 131 S.E.2d at 267.
20. Ryan v. Davis, 109 S.E.2d 409, 413 (Va. 1959) (en banc).
21. See 5 JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS' THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 13.3[2] (rev.
3d ed. 1993).
22. See ROBERT L. DUNN, RECOVERY OF DAMAGES FOR LOST PROFITS (4th ed. 1987 &
Supp. 1992).
23. See, e.g., W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 54
(5th ed. 1984).
24. State v. Hammer, 550 P.2d 820, 825 (Alaska 1976).
25. See SACKMAN, supra note 21, at § 19.06[1].
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argument merely emphasizes that profitability depends more upon one factor
than another.
That the condennor has taken the land and not the business or its profits
also supports denial of compensation for business losses.25 This view
assumes the transferability of the business, that the owner can move it without
loss of value. However, this argument ignores goodwill,27 which, depending
upon the nature of the business, may not be transferable. Goodwill is linked
to the name or product as well as to business location. Transferability of
businesses is fact-specific. 2  The argument also focuses incorrectly upon the
wrong party: "[I]nstead of looking at the benefit to the condemnor as a
measure of compensation, [it] looks to the loss to the owner, as measured by
an objective standard."29
Another reason offered in defense of noncompensation is that the rights
in a business are more intangible than those protected by the United States
Constitution. Thus, "[t]he diminution of [a business's] value is a vaguer
injury than the taking or appropriation with which the Constitution ordinarily
deals." 30 Hence, a "business is not 'property' in the constitutional sense.""
It is not clear how other rights are any more tangible than business rights.
Thus, some courts reject this restricted property definition, redefining property
as "the rights of the owner in relation" to the property.32
Recognizing that these theoretical foundations may no longer be stable,
some states have rejected the rule.33 The response has not been uniform.
The approaches vary significantly not only in the types and extent of losses
allowed34 but also in the manner by which the states have modified the rule.
26. See, e.g., Boynton v. State, 215 N.Y.S.2d 953, 956 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1961).
27. "Goodwill" is an amorphous concept that has been variously defined. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY defines it as "every positive advantage that has been acquired by a proprietor in
carrying on his business, whether connectedwith the premises in which the business is conducted,
or with the name under which it is managed, or with any other matter carrying with it the benefit
of the business." BLACK'S LAW DIcrIONARY 694 (6th ed. 1990).
28. See Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth. v. Ply-Marts, Inc., 241 S.E.2d 599, 601
(Ga. Ct. App. 1978).
29. Hammer, 500 P.2d at 824.
30. 27 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 285 (1962).
31. State ex rel. Secretary of Dep't of Highways & Transp. v. Davis Concrete of Delaware,
Inc., 355 A.2d 883, 886 (Del. 1976).
32. Bowers v. Fulton County, 146 S.E.2d 884, 890 (Ga. 1966) (quoting Woodside v. City
of Atlanta, 103 S.E.2d 108, 114-15 (Ga. 1958)).
33. Several states effected changes in the business losses rule through judicial reform,
including Alaska, Georgia, Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin. Others, such as California,
Florida, Vermont, and Wyoming, approached the issue with legislative reform. Louisiana
addressed the question through constitutional reform. See Oswald, supra note 16, at 322-62.
34. The types and extent of business losses allowed vary from loss of goodwill to going-
concern value to profits to a host of other factors.
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In Bowers, the Georgia court held that the destruction of a business is
recoverable separately and includes lost profits and diminution of the business
in addition to the realty's value." The Georgia court since has narrowed the
rule, allowing loss of business only when "the condemnee has proved that the
condemned property has some unique or peculiar relationship to the condem-
nee and his business."
3 6
Michigan also deviates from the norm:
[R]ecovery of the going concern value37 of a business lost to condemna-
tion will depend on the transferability of that business to another location.
If the business can be transferred, nothing is taken and compensation is
therefore not required. Whether a business is transferable will be decided
on a case by case basis inasmuch as a specific factual analysis is re-
quired.
38
Therefore, the Michigan approach attempts to prevent the landowner from
receiving a windfall in those cases in which successful relocation is possible.
Legislative tempering of the business losses rule has occurred in some
states,39 particularly with the adoption of the Uniform Eminent Domain
Code.40 Under state versions of the Uniform Eminent Domain Code, courts
allow compensation for the loss of goodwill subject to certain exceptions.
Paralleling the Uniform Code, the California statute provides:
The owner of a business conducted on the property taken, or on the
remainder if such property is part of a larger parcel, shall be compensated
for loss of goodwill if the owner proves all of the following: (1) The loss
is caused by the taking of the property or the injury to the remainder. (2)
The loss cannot reasonably be prevented by a relocation of the business or
by taking steps and adopting procedures that a reasonably prudent person
would take and adopt in preserving the goodwill. (3) Compensation for
the loss will not be included in payments under Section 7262 of the
Government Code. (4) Compensation for the loss will not be duplicated
in the compensation otherwise awarded to the owner.
41
35. Bowers, 146 S.E.2d at 891.
36. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 241 S.E.2d at 601.
37. Going concern value refers to the "value of a finn, assuming that the firm's organization
and assets remain intact and are used to generate future income and cash flows. The value which
inheres in a company where its business is established, as distinguished from one which has yet
to establish its business." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 691 (6th ed. 1990).
38. City of Detroit v. Michael's Prescriptions, 373 N.W.2d 219, 224 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985)
(footnote omitted).
39. See Oswald, supra note 18, at 329.
40. UNIF. EMINENT DOMAIN CODE § 1016 (1974) (addressing loss of goodwill).
41. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1263.510(a) (West 1982). The statute defines goodwill as those
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Louisiana took a constitutional approach to resolving the question of
business losses when it redrafted its constitution in 1974. The state replaced
the provision of "just and adequate compensation" with one requiring that the
owner "be compensated to the full extent of his loss."42 Louisiana courts
interpret this provision to include business losses.'
This sampling of approaches taken by various states reveals that although
the response has not been uniform, states have recognized that an inflexible
application of the rule does not produce equitable results. Business losses are
real losses borne by the landowner. The rationales traditionally offered in
support of the business losses rule may no longer be valid. Inequities may
result from the continued application of a rule that has lost its theoretical
footing.
Thus, Galbreath reaffirms the long-standing rule in South Carolina that
courts may not consider business losses resulting from the exercise of the
state's eminent domain power as an independent element of damage but may
only consider them as a factor in determining the property's market value.
Because the theoretical arguments supporting noncompensation may no longer
be valid, the courts should examine the need for a modification of the rule
articulated in Bolt and reaffirmed recently in Galbreath.
Shahin Vafai
"benefits that accrue to a business as a result of its location, reputation for dependability, skill
or quality, and other circumstances resulting in probable retention of old or acquisition of new
patronage." Id. § 1263.510(b).
42. LA. CONsT. art. I, § 4.
43. Layne v. City of Mandeville, 633 So. 2d 608, 611 (La. Ct. App. 1993).
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